Wednesday, June 1, 2011

01/06 Countering Beijing in the South China Sea


June 1, 2011
Why the U.S. must not let China’s territorial ambitions go unopposed

The most dangerous source of instability in Asia is a rising China seeking to reassert itself, and the place China is most likely to risk a military conflict is the South China Sea. In the second decade of the 21st century, the seldom-calm waters of the South China Sea are frothing from a combination of competing naval exercises and superheated rhetoric. Many pundits, politicians, and admirals see the South China Sea as a place of future competition between powers.
Speculation about impending frictions started at the July 2010 asean Regional Forum (arf) when U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton delivered an overdue statement on American interests in the South China Sea. Clinton averred that the United States has a national interest in freedom of navigation in the South China Sea; that the U.S. supported a collaborative process in resolving the territorial disputes there; and that the U.S. supports the 2002 asean-China declaration on the conduct of parties in the South China Sea.
Despite Clinton’s statement of support for China’s own agreements with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, China’s Foreign Ministry responded negatively, claiming that the secretary’s statement was “virtually an attack on China.” China’s military stated that it was opposed to “internationalization” of the six-country dispute and commenced a new and unusually large naval exercise in South China Sea the very next week.
This gathering maritime confrontation is instigated by China’s assertions of sovereignty over the entire South China Sea and its stated intention to enforce that sovereignty. But the source of China’s hubris is its view of its historic mandate to rule all under heaven. Extending China’s borders a thousand miles across the South China Sea is only one policy manifestation of this vision of a new Chinese world order. Consistent with its Sinocentric ideology, Beijing believes its authority over its smaller neighbors should include determining their foreign policy.  After Clinton challenged China’s claim to the entire South China Sea, China’s foreign minister reportedly glared at a Singaporean diplomat and pronounced, “China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that’s just a fact.”1 More telling of China’s opinion of its position among nations, the following Monday China’s Foreign Ministry posted a statement that “China’s view represented the interests of ‘fellow Asians.’”
Consistent with its Sinocentric ideology, Beijing believes its authority over its smaller neighbors should include determining their foreign policy.
The competing territorial claims in the South China Sea are decades old, but today the Chinese government is full of a sense of accomplishment and the People’s Liberation Army is flush with the fastest growing military budget in the world. Clinton’s statement may have been inspired by earlier statements by Clinton’s Chinese counterpart, the state councilor responsible for foreign affairs, Dai Bingguo, directly to Clinton herself and repeated to several U.S. aides that the enforcement of China’s sovereignty over the South China Sea was a “core interest” on par with Taiwan and Tibet. While Dai Bingguo reportedly has desisted from using the term “core interest” to describe China’s maritime sovereignty, personalities in China’s military still do. In January 2011 the web site of the People’s Daily, the official organ of the Chinese Communist party, surveyed readers about whether the South China Sea is China’s “core interest”; 97 percent of nearly 4,300 respondents said yes.2
Short of a shooting war, protecting freedom of navigation in one of the globe’s busiest sea lanes requires an amicable resolution of the competing territorial claims. Starting a process to resolve or neutralize the problem will require American leadership and resolve. Firm diplomacy backed by convincing naval power and patient leadership can strike a balance in the region that protects freedom of navigation, the integrity of international law, and the independence and sovereignty of Southeast Asia’s nations.
The worst solution to the South China Sea dispute from the U.S. point of view would be for China’s asean neighbors simply to acquiesce to Beijing’s position and for the entire South China Sea to become the sovereign territory of the People’s Republic of China (prc). The Beijing position is also the worst solution for the asean and every other trading nation on the planet. But an almost as bad solution is for the U.S. to become involved in a bilateral confrontation with China without the firm endorsement and commitment to American actions by the other littoral claimants and by America’s Asia-Pacific allies. Without the support of regional alliances, the U.S. would be entangled in a campaign at the far end of its logistical tail but deep inside the reach of a large and rising power.
The ideal solution would be for the asean countries to stand up to China and insist on a multilateral resolution to the disputes based on the provisions of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea and the code of conduct specified by the Treaty of Amity and Commerce, which China signed in 2002. This solution is not possible unlessasean develops the political, economic and military resources to challenge China’s influence. In the short term, backing from the United States and other regional powers including Japan, India, and Australia could be an incubator while asean develops an indigenous deterrent capability. In the long term, it must stand up for itself.
asean will be reluctant to accept American assistance if it is presented as a part of a great power, anti-China geopolitical policy. China is not only a neighbor to Southeast Asia, but also its most important trading partner, investor, and occasional political ally. Asserting a Chinese menace and asking the asean countries to participate in an anti-Chinese coalition is a recipe for policy failure. Instead, the United States must articulate a vision for the nations of Asia that contrasts with the re-imposition of ancient Chinese hegemony. That vision should include the traditional Western principles of open commerce, political independence, and territorial sovereignty.
THE SOUTH CHINA SEA PROBLEM
Six countries claim the islands of the South China Sea: the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of China (Taiwan), Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei. The prc and Taiwan (as rival governments of “China”) claim the South China Sea by virtue of cultural artifacts, ambiguous literary allusions, and outright occupation. Vietnam also claims all of the islands in the South China Sea based largely on historical documents, Japan’s postwar abandonment of title to the South Sea islets, and the legacy of French colonial deeds to several key South China Sea islets. The Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei claim all or parts of the Sea’s southern swath of Spratly Islands based largely on their respective Exclusive Economic Zones ( eezs) and continental shelf. According to unclos, an eez extends 200 nautical miles from the low-water line on a country’s coast. China’s published map of the South China Sea shows a dotted line extending all the way to the eez of Indonesia’s Natuna Island, potentially enlarging the number of conflicting claimants to seven.
This problem is not an arcane legal issue, but a near and dangerous threat to the global economy and to the regional ecology. The sea lines of communications through the South China Sea connect Europe and Asia, making the sea one of the busiest waterways in the world. Almost half of world shipping passes across it, and from the Middle East a significant portion of northeast Asia’s oil. The South China Sea is also rich in hydrocarbons in various forms, and the full exploitation of these resources is hampered by unresolved boundaries and blatant military intimidation. Lastly, because of overfishing, there is a marked decline in the overall fish catch, inspiring fisherman to use more aggressive techniques. With no multilateral agreement to regulate fishing in the South China Sea the fishing industry and sea ecology are rapidly approaching disaster.
Disputes over the South China Sea are not arcane legal issues but dangerous threats to the global economy and to the regional ecology.
China’s claim. All the claimant countries justify their respective territorial claims using highly interpretive definitions ofunclos articles. Only China, however, exhibits the combination of broad territorial claims; economic, political, and military strength; an uncompromising diplomatic stance; and demonstrated aggressiveness in pursuing its objectives. This unique combination of traits makes Beijing at once the most important player in resolving the territorial disputes and the biggest obstacle to doing so.
When discussion turns to diplomacy and a negotiated resolution to the dispute, Beijing persists in reminding all other claimant countries that the South China Sea is Chinese sovereign territory and refuses to negotiate unless the parties accept China’s indisputable sovereignty. To date, China’s tactic is to engage in talks only bilaterally and avoid objective adjudication through <unclos procedures or any outside parties. Additionally, China has made declarations and provided highly interpretive definitions that exceedingly complicate the resolution process and put China on a collision course with the rest of the seagoing world.
Continental shelves and the impracticality of drawing coastal boundaries for countries with complex and deeply indented coastlines, like Norway, or for archipelagic states, such as the Philippines or Indonesia, were recognized in such unclos provisions as Article 7 (“Straight baselines”), Article 47 (“Archipelagic baselines”), and Articles 76 and77 (“Continental Shelf”). These articles permit countries to draw straight boundary lines across complex or closely spaced coastal features and islands as long as they do not interfere with customary freedom of navigation. Beijing, however, extends the definitions of these articles by applying them to its claimed islands and coastal features.3
The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress adopted the “Law on the Territorial Waters and Their Contiguous Areas” (Territorial Sea Law) on February 25, 1992. This law does not specify China’s exact territorial claim, but it does assert sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. Moreover, China has published a map showing the entire South China Sea from Hainan Island up to Indonesia’s Natuna Island in an enclosed loop as territorial waters. In 1993, China’s foreign minister verbally reassured his Indonesian counterpart that the densely populated and economically important Natuna Island was not claimed by China, but Beijing has since failed to formally confirm that informal statement.
According to unclos and international custom, “territorial waters” extend twelve nautical miles from the low-water line along a country’s coast. When Beijing signed unclos, however, it included declarations that postulated definitions of territorial waters and rights of coastal states different from those written in unclos. Among other things, China declared that:
1. In accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the People’s Republic of China shall enjoy sovereign rights and jurisdiction over an exclusive economic zone of 200 nautical miles and the continental shelf.
2. The People’s Republic of China will effect, through consultations, the delimitation of boundary of maritime jurisdiction with the states with coasts opposite or adjacent to China, respectively, on the basis of international law and in accordance with the equitable principle.
3. The People’s Republic of China reaffirms the sovereignty over all its archipelagoes and islands as listed in Article 2 of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, which was promulgated on February 25, 1992.
4. The People’s Republic of China reaffirms that the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea concerning innocent passage through the territorial sea shall not prejudice the right of a coastal state to request, in accordance with its laws and regulations, a foreign state to obtain advance approval from or give prior notification to the coastal state for the passage of its warships through the territorial sea of the coastal state.
These declarations substantially change the meaning of unclos articles and are in marked contrast to traditional sea laws. China claims its eez is not just an economic boundary but sovereign territory, thus extending its maritime border200 nautical miles. Beijing is also claiming that the uninhabited islands and reefs of the South China Sea are Chinese territory and, thus, also have eez extending an additional 200 nautical miles from each of them, and that its continental shelf extends as far as Beijing chooses to draw it. Finally, the declarations greatly broaden China’s prerogatives as a coastal state by insisting that warships making innocent passage must first obtain Chinese permission, again a violation of both unclos and the traditional laws of the sea.
Beijing is also claiming that the uninhabited islands and reefs of the South China Sea are Chinese territory and, thus, also have EEZ.
The position of the Chinese government has direct implications for regional economies, the freedom of navigation of global air and surface fleets, and America’s naval and air forces. If China were entitled to enforce its sovereignty over the South China Sea, then merchant ships traversing that Sea, no matter their flag, would be subject to China’s law and regulations and any fees, duties or other restrictions China may choose to impose. Additionally, China would have exclusive fishing and mineral rights over a Sea that the other littoral countries depend on for a significant portion of their natural resource income. Lastly, China’s insistence that any warship traversing the South China Sea must first gain permission nullifies the rights of foreign warships to conduct innocent passage. Furthermore, warships that do traverse territorial waters have severe restrictions applied to their operations.
These restrictions, if applied to the entire South China Sea, would severely restrict the operations of the United Sates Navy and hinder its ability to protect both American and international shipping. Furthermore, in light of China’s position, the dispute between China and the United States over the activities of the ep-3 reconnaissance airplane near Hainan Island in April 2001; the multiple harassing actions against the American ships USNS Impeccable andVictorious in the Spring of 2009; the collision between a Chinese submarine and the USNS John McCain’s sonar array in June 2009, and the recent show of force through naval exercises in the Yellow Sea are not isolated incidents, but rather the latest chapters of China’s campaign to assert its sovereignty over the South China Sea and could well be the first rounds in an escalating shoving match between China and the United States.
How strong is China’s claim? In the 9th century, an Arab trading dhow sank off Belitung Island, in what are now Indonesian waters, at the southern reaches of the South China Sea. The ship was laden with 60,000 artifacts of gold, silver, and exquisite porcelain apparently from China’s southern port metropolis of Guangzhou and bound for markets in Southeast Asia. The dhow was discovered in 1998 by Indonesian fishermen and is now considered one of the most important finds in maritime archeology.
The Belitung wreck was not a Chinese merchant vessel (Tang Dynasty China did not have a functioning seafaring culture), but it is emblematic of China’s new Sinocentric ideology of preeminence in East Asia. The Chinese government’s claim to the South China Sea is based in part on ancient relics, coins, pottery shards, and the like that litter South China Sea islets. The fact that these artifacts most likely were not left by Chinese sailors does not appear to influence Beijing’s outlandish claims.
China also justifies its claims to the South China Sea with various vague writings dating back more than 2,000 years.
Neither can Beijing demonstrate that Chinese ever permanently inhabited the Spratly or Paracel Islands, because they are uninhabitable. Many are wholly or intermittently submerged. The ones that are mostly dry lack sources of fresh water, and these low features are seasonally exposed to the monsoons. Today, the only human populations of these islands and reefs are military garrisons maintained at immense expense to their respective governments and at great personal risk to their members. They can by no means be said to have “an economic life of their own” and consequently are not able to generate their own eez under Article 121 of unclos.
China also cites various vague, questionable, and off-point historical writings dating back more than 2,000 years in its attempt to document its claimed sovereignty over the South China Sea.4 Without doubt, Chinese explorers and fisherman sailed the South China Sea for two thousand years, and some recorded their exploits, but it is equally clear that the Chinese traditionally have viewed Hainan Island as the southernmost outpost of their civilization, certainly until the end of the 19th century.5
Ancient Chinese records do not disprove the claims of Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, or Indonesia. There is substantial archeology showing that today’s Southeast Asians lived on those archipelagos long before written Chinese history. Several waves of settlers arrived in the Indonesian and Philippine archipelagos as far back as 250,000 years. These early peoples sailed or paddled the South China Sea to arrive where their descendents are living today. Although the Spratly and Paracel Islands were too small for permanent habitation, peoples of all the littoral countries fished and economically exploited them before China existed.
For countries that are littoral to the South China Sea, China’s claims are analogous to one of your neighbors claiming that the entire street in front of your home is his personal property. Furthermore, he claims that your sidewalk, driveway, and front yard clear up to the doorstep also belong to him. His armed guards park their cars in your driveway and he picks flowers out of your garden. If you or your neighbors protest he denies the validity of your title and refuses to settle in court. If someone insists on his property rights then the guards beat him.
COMPETING VISIONS
The international community, led by the United States, is already pursuing a vision of Southeast Asia’s future and the resolution of the South China Sea disputes that competes with China’s world view. The world’s vision of nation states is of the Westphalian model of independent countries with sovereign territories. The United Nations Charter and the un Convention on the Law of the Sea are manifestations of that model. China’s vision, on the other hand, is a Chinese world order, a new face to China’s ancient tributary system where China is the central power and Beijing is the global political pole.
The countries of Southeast Asia have already adopted the Westphalian model as their own and formed asean as an explicit defense of member countries’ sovereignty and independence. Nevertheless, the tributary system is a familiar part of Southeast Asia’s history and at the cost of independence it was tolerable, especially as an alternative to confrontation with Chinese military power.
The Chinese world order. The mechanics of the tributary system are often described as relatively benign. Countries paid a tribute, the kings or their ambassadors performed a kowtow ceremony to the Chinese emperor acknowledging his sovereignty, and in exchange they were given expensive gifts and granted lucrative trade concessions. According to the historians that espouse this view of the tributary system the Chinese emperors rarely intervened in the internal affairs of a country and were not territorially acquisitive.
The reality is that the Chinese emperors viewed their vassal kingdoms in the same terms as the European monarchs viewed their colonies: The emperor did not hesitate to use military force in order to protect his property. For example, in the 15th century, a tribute-paying king on the Indonesian island of Java killed some Chinese imperial envoys who had been sent to recognize the investiture of the self-proclaimed “king” of the Chinese colony at Palembang, a colony that had been subordinate to Java. In response the emperor sent a large naval fleet to deliver a note that said, “You should immediately send 60,000 ounces of gold to redeem your crime, so that you may preserve your land and people. Otherwise we cannot stop our armies from going to punish you.”6
When the Chinese Communist party usurped the emperor’s throne in 1947 it sought to regain control over all the empire’s former realms. The venerable China scholar John K. Fairbanks described China’s world view in concentric circles with a an inner “Sinic Zone” of nearby countries that were culturally similar, the “Inner Asia Zone” of tributary states on the fringe of Chinese territory, and the “Outer Zone” of barbarians. The Kingdom of Kashgar was once a tributary state in the Outer Zone, as opposed to Korea, which was in the inner Sinic Zone. Today the former Kingdom of Kashgar is part of the Chinese province renamed Xinjiang. Although the same colony twice declared independence as the East Turkistan Republic (in 1933 and 1944) the People’s Liberation Army “peacefully liberated” the independent state from itself in 1949.
The Chinese emperors viewed their vassal kingdoms the same as the European monarchs viewed their colonies.
The People’s Republic of China lacked the strength to extend its influence to all the empire’s former vassals. Korea escaped Kashgar’s fate because of the rise of the Japanese Empire. Korea became a battleground between the Chinese and Japanese Empires, and was won by the Japanese Emperor in 1895. Despite the painful memories of Japanese occupation, the silver lining for today’s Koreans is that Japanese colonization and the aftermath of World War II prevented China from annexing Korea as it did East Turkistan and Tibet.
The proposition that Korea could share the fate of other former Chinese vassal states is not mere speculation but the considered opinion of the Chinese Academy of Social Science. In 2002, the Chinese government launched a research effort called the Northeast Project. In 2004 project researchers from the Chinese Academy of Social Science declared that the ancient Korean Kingdom of Koguryo was not an independent kingdom, but a Chinese province. The same year, China’s Foreign Ministry removed all references to Koguryo as a period of Korean history from its website. The Chinese government hosted similar research efforts called the Northwest Project and Southwest Project for Xinjiang and Tibet respectively. It is perhaps only a matter of time before the Chinese Academy of Science launches fresh research projects on China’s former vassals in Southeast Asia.
Southeast Asia also owes its contemporary independence to foreign occupation. Between the 17th and 19th centuries, European powers extended their empires to many of China’s tributary states across southern Asia and Southeast Asia, including Vietnam and several kingdoms that ruled in regions of the modern-day Philippines and Indonesia. The Japanese and Europeans plucked these states from the weak Chinese emperor in what modern China derides as the “unequal treaties,” and they turned China’s colonies into European colonies. After the Japanese empire was destroyed in World War II and the European empires retreated from Asia, the most important legacy of their occupation was the residual concept of independent and sovereign states. China was too weak to reassert control over its former tributary states against European and American opposition, and new countries were built on the boundary templates of the former colonies freed, at least temporarily, from Chinese influence.
China disregards treaties and bases its current territorial claims on the pre-colonial tributary relationships.
In pursuit of Beijing’s ambitions, China disregards the “unequal treaties” negotiated with Japan and the European powers and bases its current territorial claims on the pre-colonial tributary relationships. For example, between 1992and 2000 China and Vietnam negotiated their Gulf of Tonkin maritime boundaries. The basis for Vietnam’s claim in the Gulf was an 1887 treaty between France and China that established Vietnam’s modern borders. China, however, would not recognize the validity of the treaty or Vietnam’s historic claims.7  A treaty was eventually agreed to, but it was evidently so inequitable to Vietnam that Hanoi kept the terms secret for years. Eventually some of the terms leaked out, inflaming nationalist passions and threatening the stability of the Vietnamese government.
Since every country in Southeast Asia derives its present-day borders from colonial era treaties and agreements (including even Thailand, which was never a European colony, but did sign border treaties with European empires), Vietnam’s experience should serve as warning to any of the asean countries trying to bilaterally negotiate with China. Nevertheless, shortly after Vietnam concluded its border treaties President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo of the Philippines struck an agreement with China, in 2004, for oil exploration. Like Vietnam she also tried unsuccessfully to keep the terms secret. The formerly secret Annex “a” showed that the delineated boundaries included huge areas of the Philippines’ eez. Of the total of almost 150,000 square kilometers covered in the agreement, around24,000 square kilometers included maritime territory previously claimed only by the Philippines. When the terms of the secret treaty were finally exposed, nationalist passions were once again inflamed. Amado Macasaet, publisher of the popular and respectable Philippine magazine Malaya, went so far as to say that President Arroyo should be charged with treason for signing the agreements he claimed were made in exchange for loans “attended by bribery and corruption.” Afterward even the overthrown former President Marcos was more popular than Arroyo.
For China’s former colonies, there is little reason to believe that appeasing China in the South China Sea will satisfy its appetite for territory or hegemony. In the Chinese world order China is not one country in a community but the oldest civilized country among upstarts. Any country’s sovereignty is ultimately owed to China and the degree of independence depends on its appreciation of Beijing’s “core interests.” In asserting its “indisputable sovereignty” over the South China Sea, Beijing is laying down its markers as if to say, “We can solve this problem the easy way, or the hard way, but it will be China’s way.”
PERCEPTIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Aggressive american diplomacy that seeks to pull together a “balancing alliance” against China can only confirm China’s suspicions of an American strategy to contain China while, at the same time, American actions are alienating Southeast Asian governments. asean capitals are more concerned about China than Washington, but they are also far more vulnerable to Beijing’s economic and military pressures and thus reluctant to provoke Chinese retribution. Ideally, asean would have the United States Navy steam in force into the South China Sea to maintain the peace, while asean then clucks disapprovingly from the sidelines and reassures the Chinese that it had nothing to do with it. Intellectually, of course, asean knows that it has to do better than that. Understanding the views of the asean countries is the first step in developing a balanced and appropriate policy.
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand formed asean in 1967 with the stated goal of fostering peace and stability, but the most important goal was to gain every member’s acceptance of the Westphalian-like principle of “mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, and national identity of all nations.” During the Cold War, asean continued to evolve as a diplomatic tool to fence out superpower competition in the region. After the Cold War, asean recruited Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, and focused on economic development. In the 21st century, security issues are again taking precedence on the aseanagenda. First it was international terrorism and maritime piracy that inspired inter-asean security cooperation, and now the rise of China increasingly tops the agenda of security discussion.
Citing the recent steep rise in military spending in Southeast Asia, some analysts speculate that these countries are already preparing for military competition with China. For example, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute has reported that arms imports to Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia rose by 84 percent, 146 percent, and722 percent, respectively, in the last five years. In the same timeframe Thailand’s defense budget has doubled. Some analysts argue that this huge increase in defense spending is an indicator of Southeast Asia’s concern over the Chinese threat. Unfortunately, like many government-led activities in Southeast Asia, there is much less substance than the raw data suggest.
In Malaysia, for example, the often-cited billion-dollar purchase of French submarines and many other expensive weapon systems perhaps has more to do with extravagant corruption than with strategic defense planning.8  In fact, the history of arms purchases in Malaysia appears burdened with corruption — a way of bejeweling its armed forces with expensive, low-density weapons that complicate logistics without adding combat value.
In the Philippines, vulnerable to the Chinese juggernaut, national security is sacrificed to domestic politics.
In Thailand, the current military buildup began only after the Royal Thai Army’s 2006 coup installed an Army-dependent government. Furthermore, although the generals espouse a pro-American defense policy to visiting U.S. officials, their equipment purchases are from an unusual mix of non-U.S. companies. From a logistics point of view a menagerie of military equipment is difficult and expensive to maintain; on the other hand, using smaller, non-U.S. arms suppliers may give Thai officers easier access to kickbacks.
In the Philippines, the Southeast Asian country that is second only to Vietnam in its vulnerability to the Chinese juggernaut, national security is sacrificed to domestic politics. Since September 11< the United States has engaged in a sustained effort to improve the capabilities of the Philippine Armed Forces. Total U.S. assistance tripled from roughly $38 million in 2001 to almost $120 million in 2010. Additionally, not counted in those assistance dollars are the millions spent on an ongoing series of robust U.S.-Philippine military exercises designed to improve the capabilities of the Philippine Armed Forces. Unfortunately, despite the sincere efforts of the U.S. Pacific Command, there have been only marginal improvements in the paf.
This lack of improvement relates to the declining Philippine defense budget. As U.S. assistance grew, the Philippine Congress cut the defense budget. Besides the China threat the Philippines is also beleaguered by multiple internal insurgencies, yet most of the paf’s equipment is Vietnam War vintage and the defense budget is now only about one percent of gdp, or about $1.16 billion in 2009. Despite, or perhaps because of America’s unstinting assistance, many Philippine politicians, including the newly elected President Benigno Aquino III, feel that they are entitled to more. Ignoring their own complicity in underfunding Philippine security forces, these politicians are calling for a review of the Visiting Forces Agreement (the agreement that permits the American military presence to help train the paf). Their objection is that the U.S. is not doing enough to modernize the Philippine Armed Forces, and they imagine the Visiting Forces Agreement as a tool to leverage ever greater American military subsidies.
Fortunately, the security picture in Southeast Asia is not all venality and indolence. Both Vietnam and Indonesia are making significant arms purchases focused on strengthening their national security. Additionally, after decades of wise investment, Singapore’s armed forces are world-class and by far the most powerful in asean.
ASEAN’s total air and naval forces are imposing, but they are not enough to defeat the powerful Chinese Army.
On paper, asean’s total air and naval forces are imposing. asean boasts a fleet of 680 fixed-wing combat aircraft, 412surface combat vessels, and eight submarines in the combined navies.9 These numbers are not enough to defeat the powerful People’s Liberation Army, with its 2,300 combat aircraft, 65 submarines, and 256 surface combat vessels, but they are sufficient to act as a deterrent were there any sense of common defense. Unfortunately, aseanis not nato: No country in Southeast Asia is treaty-bound to assist another in case of an attack, and there are few solely indigenous efforts to coordinate military activities.
Indonesia is the largest country in Southeast Asia, making up 40 percent of the region’s population; it has the largest economy and is a developing democracy. Indonesia’s views on China’s activities reflect Jakarta’s vision of itself as an informal leader of asean. Speaking at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa said, “For members of asean, what is more worrying is the possibility that the South China Sea could be a central theater for possible rivalry.” Indonesia’s goal, and by extension asean’s as well, is to balance the United States against the Chinese in order to protect their territorial integrity and independence.
The government of Vietnam perceives China as nothing less than an existential threat; an anxiety validated by historical experience. Vietnam’s recorded history dates back 2,700 years. China occupied the country for more than a thousand of those years and Hanoi was subject to a burdensome tributary status for most of the rest of its history. Despite many long and difficult wars with China, Hanoi enjoyed genuine independence for only brief periods.
Hanoi’s experience with post-empire China is the latter’s enduring disregard of Vietnam’s sovereignty and independence. In 1979, in order to chastise Hanoi for policies Beijing did not like, China attacked Vietnam and briefly occupied parts of the country. Additionally, China’s pla Navy has on multiple occasions attacked and sunk Vietnamese naval vessels operating just off southern Vietnam and hundreds of miles from China’s coast; Chinese soldiers garrison tiny islands and atolls inside Vietnam’s eezpla Navy vessels frequently harass or arrest Vietnamese fishermen; and Beijing interferes with Hanoi’s efforts to exploit natural gas resources well inside Vietnam’s eez. Nevertheless, Hanoi is careful not to provoke China and continues to seek good relations with Beijing.
Hanoi’s experience with post-empire China is the latter’s enduring disregard of Vietnam’s independence.
Although Singapore is not party to the South China Sea maritime territorial dispute, and 75 percent of its population is of Chinese descent, Singapore’s views on rising China prove the rule that asean is suspicious of China’s intentions. Singapore is an ethnically diverse country, but the bulk of its population is descended from Chinese immigrants, mostly laborers brought in during British rule. Because of its immigrant population and economic success some countries in the region resent Singapore and often voice suspicions of its loyalties. Although Singapore has for decades built strong economic links with China, it waited until 1990 to open formal relations with the People’s Republic — the last country in asean to do so. Singapore continues that strong economic link, but China’s recent belligerence has forced Singapore to declare its side.
In order to assure its neighbors (and notify China) that Singapore is not a Chinese province, Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, at the August 2010 National Day celebration, made a point of describing Singapore’s unique cultural identity, including the adoption of English as the national language and the distinctive Singaporean cuisine. To emphasize that message, in a September 6, 2010, editorial the Straits Times, Singapore’s national newspaper and government mouthpiece, emphasized that the people of Singapore were not overseas Chinese, saying, “the term ‘Overseas Chinese’ should rankle Singaporeans of all races because it implies that the Chinese in Singapore are somehow ‘overseas,’ separated from the ‘mainland.’ It also implies a desire to perhaps ‘return’ some day. In fact, most Singaporeans here are not ‘overseas.’ They are rooted here.” In another editorial last summer theStraits Times guardedly approved Washington’s new approach to the South China Sea and warned Beijing that its “actions will be closely watched for what it says about the growing power’s ‘peaceful rise.’”
Singapore’s biggest concern about the new U.S. policy is not fear of provoking China but the fickleness of American foreign policy, a point of view that reflects the broader asean position. From asean’s point of view, despite decades of strident Chinese declarations and demonstrative military actions, the U.S. has been “standoffish” about the dispute; seemingly unaware or unconcerned of Beijing’s acquisitiveness in the South China Sea and the implications for the region and the globe. For example, when the Philippines, an American treaty ally, discovered a Chinese naval installation on Mischief Reef, Washington did not share Manila’s outrage and took no position on the dispute, even as the Chinese continued to expand and enlarge their presence.
But asean countries are ambivalent about both America and China. They ask for consistent American support and presence to balance China. At the same time, many asean countries are reluctant to grant the U.S. too much access for fear of compromising their sovereignty. asean countries fear China’s military power and political intentions, but they welcome Chinese investment and trading opportunities in the vast Chinese market.
Finally, asean countries are far from unified in their view of China as a threat. Four of asean’s ten countries, Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand, are not party to the South China Sea territorial dispute. Burma’s junta, an international pariah regime, ranks the People’s Republic of China among the few governments friendly to it and would be reluctant to defend its asean partners against its patron’s encroachment. Thailand is in the midst of deep political schism and unlikely to participate in a common defense. Furthermore, Thailand’s elite are proud of Thailand’s flexible “bamboo” foreign policy and see no reason not to bend with the wind from China. The royal families in both Thailand and Cambodia are on friendly terms with the Chinese government. Lastly, asean’s consensus decision process means that Beijing needs only one dissenting vote to avoid asean censure.
MOVING FORWARD
The countries of Southeast Asia use asean to create a diplomatic fence around the region. As recent events have shown, however, a rising China is pushing against that boundary and asean is now wishing for increased United States presence to balance the Chinese encroachment. The harsh reality is that even ironclad security treaties and the presence of American warships are not enough to protect Southeast Asian countries if they are not willing to defend themselves. The asean countries must act individually and collectively to create a substantive deterrent to Chinese encroachment. To quote the poet Robert Frost, “Good fences make good neighbors,” andasean lacks the institutional strength, cohesion, and unity of purpose to build  a good fence.
China poses a substantial and present military threat, but starting U.S. assistance with a buildup of asean militaries is analogous to building a house by starting with the roof. The first priority must be for the individual countries to build a foundation for that house by cleaning up their legal systems and reducing corruption. With the exception of Singapore, every country in asean is afflicted with deeply corrupt legal systems. Judicial corruption is extremely unpopular, known in Indonesia as the “judicial mafia,” and U.S. assistance in fighting it would be welcome. The U.S. has a number of programs, particularly in the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security, that can assist indigenous judicial-reform efforts and should be the first priority for assistance to the region.
Substantial improvement in ASEAN’s legal systems and growth in its economies must come before increased military strength.
The second priority for building asean’s house is the economic walls and posts that will hold up the roof. asean has made progress in loosening inter-asean trade restrictions, but it must continue to expand those efforts, and the countries must reform their internal economies to permit economic growth. Again, the U.S. has many departments and agencies that can and should aid economic development in Southeast Asia. In particular, the U.S. Trade Representative could negotiate an enhanced trade agreement between the U.S. andasean, perhaps modeled on the U.S.-Vietnam trade agreement that did so much to assist Vietnam’s economic reforms.
In Southeast Asia the U.S. can for a time provide a security shield for the asean countries, but that commitment must not become a bottomless obligation. Security subsidies, like welfare, trade, or industrial subsidies, can become expensive entitlements and eventually prompt behavior that runs counter to the original intent of the subsidy.
If there is substantial improvement in the legal systems and growth in the economies, then increased military strength will follow naturally. Relieved of the burden of purchasing weapons systems whose only practical use is enriching politicians or generals will significantly increase military capability without costing an additional penny. Furthermore, with larger and more robust national economies, the regional militaries will gain more resources for modernization without increasing their burden on taxpayers. The Pentagon already has robust military assistance programs in the region, and improved national militaries will be more able to take advantage of American assistance.
Diplomatically, asean should begin inter-asean negotiations on internal borders. Beginning the process may force China to ask to participate in the multilateral process, allowing asean to set the terms of the negotiations. Even if Beijing will not participate, an asean border agreement would complicate China’s diplomacy and spoil its bilateral intimidation.
Militarily, asean should begin the process of improving its ability to conduct collective military defense. Building on the small steps already begun — fighting transnational terrorism, suppressing maritime piracy, and providing disaster relief — the asean militaries should begin to look for opportunities to improve their ability to perform coalition operations. asean’s stated diplomatic and political goals are to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the member nations. Building a collective military deterrent to defend those goals against all possible adversaries is not an anti-China activity.
Lastly, it is not the purpose of this article to argue that Beijing will necessarily enforce its ancient prerogatives, but rather that the Sinocentric ideology is the historical base from which Chinese leaders will view the world. Beijing must be convinced to become a devoted adherent to the Westphalian model. Former Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick often opined that China needed to be more of a “stakeholder” in the international system and that that goal needs to remain a long-term U.S. policy objective. During the latter half of the 20th century, China greatly benefited from the inherent protections of the Westphalian model of a nation-state and the broader international system. Now that China is big enough to influence the world order, it must not be permitted to establish a tiered structure with China demanding greater rights than other countries.
Washington policymakers must remember that China is not currently a threat to any country. Although there is considerable potential for a U.S.-China clash, good diplomacy in Washington and growing political maturity in Beijing may obviate any such confrontation. The best way to achieve this goal is to embed China in rules-based organizations and then insist that Beijing abide by those rules. The most important global maritime treaty is unclos, but the United States has not yet ratified the treaty and thus has less power to influence the treaty implementation than does China. The only way for the U.S. to get a seat at the unclos table is to ratify unclos and participate in the various commissions guiding its implementation.
American interests in maintaining the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and other contested waters should be defended with diplomacy backed by military strength. The U.S. must not flinch or compromise, because any temporary concession to China’s demonstrably unreasonable demands will not earn gratitude, but instead will become a precedent for China’s future demands. Diplomatically and militarily, Washington must continue to deploy sufficient force to deter China’s unjustifiable territorial ambitions.

Dana R. Dillon is the author of The China Challenge (2007) and a frequent commentator on Asian and national security issues.

1 John Pomfret, “U.S. takes a tougher tone with China,”Washington Post (July 30, 2010).
2 Edward Wong, “China Hedges Over Whether South China Sea is a ‘Core Interest’ Worth War,” New York Times(March 30, 2011).
3 Max Herriman, “China’s Territorial Sea Law and International Law of the Sea,” Maritime Studies 15 (1997). See also the discussion of China’s claim by Xavier Furtado in “International Law and the Dispute over the Spratly Islands: Whither unclos?” Contemporary Southeast Asia 21:3 (December 1, 1999).
4 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Jurisprudential Evidence to Support China’s Sovereignty over the Nansha Islands” (2000).
5 See the introduction to Edward H. Schafer, Shore of Pearls (University of California Press, 1970).
6 Giovanni Andornino, “The Nature and Linkages of China’s Tributary System under the Ming and Qing Dynasties,” Global Economic History Network working paper 21 (2006).
7 Zou Keyuan, “The Sino-Vietnamese Agreement on Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the Gulf of Tonkin,” Ocean Development & International Law 36 (2005).
8 Asian Sentinel has published an excellent series of articles exposing the submarine scandal in Malaysia, but John Berthelsen’s individual piece provides a good synopsis: John Berthelsen, “Malaysia’s Submarine Scandal Surfaces in France,” Asian Sentinel (April 16, 2010).
9 These numbers are based primarily on material published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in “The Military Balance in Asia: 1990–2010.”




01/06 Nhân dân nhật báo TQ xuyên tạc vụ xâm phạm lãnh hải VN như thế nào?

Thứ tư, 01 Tháng 6 2011 09:18

(GDVN) - Sự thực vụ tàu Hải giám Trung Quốc xâm phạm vùng biển chủ quyền lãnh hải của Việt Nam và ngang nhiên cắt cáp thăm dò tàu Bình Minh đã rõ như ban ngày, nhưng tờ Nhân dân nhật báo Trung Quốc bản Online ngày 31/5 lại bóp méo sự thật khi đăng bài "Chuyên gia: Việt Nam có ý đồ gây hấn trên biển Đông, Trung Quốc không thể cứ tự kiềm chế mãi".

Tàu Bình Minh 02 của Tập đoàn dầu khí quốc gia Việt Nam (PVN)
Tàu Bình Minh 02 của Tập đoàn dầu khí quốc gia Việt Nam (PVN)
 

Theo tờ báo này, những va chạm xảy ra ngày càng thường xuyên giữa hai nước trên biển Đông xung quanh vấn đề khai thác dầu khí dẫn đến việc giới ngoại giao hai bên chỉ trích lẫn nhau, nhưng vụ việc sáng 26/5 là lần va chạm nghiêm trọng nhất dẫn đến phản ứng gay gắt từ phía Bộ Ngoại giao Việt Nam.

Trong buổi họp báo ngày 29/5, người phát ngôn Bộ Ngoại giao Việt Nam bà Nguyễn Phương Nga đã dõng dạc khẳng định, Hải quân Việt Nam sẽ làm mọi việc cần thiết để bảo vệ vững chắc hòa bình, độc lập chủ quyền và toàn vẹn lãnh thổ của Việt Nam.

Tuyên bố ấy của Bộ Ngoại giao Việt Nam được tờ báo này luận giải thành "lời lẽ thiếu bình tĩnh". Đồng thời tờ báo này nhai lại giọng điệu cũ, hai bên Việt - Trung còn tồn tại mâu thuẫn chủ quyền lãnh hải thì việc cả hai cùng tự kiềm chế là vô cùng cần thiết.
 
Tờ báo này dẫn lời "chuyên gia" nhưng không đưa rõ là "chuyên gia" nào dám ngạo mạn cho rằng, Trung Quốc là một nước lớn có thực lực mạnh hơn Việt Nam rất nhiều, những năm qua đã "cố gắng tránh" làm căng thẳng thêm quan hệ song phương trong vấn đề biển Đông, đồng thời "Trung Quốc không có ý đồ chèn ép Việt Nam" và "Việt Nam biết rất rõ điều đó".
 
Ảnh chụp tiêu đề bài báo xấc xược của tờ Nhân dân nhật báo Trung Quốc online
Ảnh chụp tiêu đề bài báo xấc xược của tờ Nhân dân nhật báo
Trung Quốc online
 


Trên thực tế thì sao? Ngoài việc ban hành lệnh cấm đánh bắt cá trên vùng biển chủ quyền của Việt Nam, Trung Quốc đã phái tàu xâm phạm vùng biển chủ quyền và ngang nhiên cắt cáp thăm dò tàu Bình Minh của Việt Nam.
 
Giải thích cho hành động vi phạm trắng trợn ấy, tờ Nhân dân nhật báo lại bóp méo sự thật - "Việt Nam thường có thái độ kích động, liên tục khai thác dầu khí ở vùng tranh chấp và di dân ra các đảo tranh chấp khiến Trung Quốc không thể nhịn được nữa".
 
Sau khi Ngoại trưởng Mỹ công bố quan điểm của Washington về vấn đề biển Đông hồi tháng 7 năm ngoái, ưu thế chiến lược của Việt Nam gia tăng, đồng thời "ý đồ mạo hiểm của Việt Nam cũng tăng lên."

Kết thúc bài phân tích của "chuyên gia", tờ Nhân dân nhật báo online Trung Quốc một lần nữa lên mặt "nhắc nhở", nếu Việt Nam tiếp tục cho rằng "Trung Quốc có thể nhẫn nhịn để Việt Nam (thích làm gì thì làm) thích lấy muối biển Đông lúc nào thì lấy", đó sẽ là sai lầm chiến lược.
 
Video chi tiết nhất vụ tàu TQ xâm phạm lãnh hải VN (hình ảnh bản quyền của Petrotimes).


01/06 Tuyên bố "Đường lưỡi bò" của Trung Quốc là không phù hợp

Thứ tư, 01 Tháng 6 2011 13:51

Theo phóng viên TTXVN tại Jakarta, Hội thảo quốc tế "Triển vọng hợp tác, những vấn đề hội tụ và động lực ở Biển Đông" tại Jakarta (Indonesia) kết thúc chiều 31/5 đã ra Tuyên bố Jakarta.

Tuyên bố Jakarta nhấn mạnh các đại biểu tham dự hội thảo cho rằng duy trì hòa bình và ổn định ở Biển Đông là cần thiết cho toàn bộ khu vực, vì lợi ích chung của các nước ven biển và các nước liên quan.

Các đại biểu nhất trí Biển Đông là vấn đề đa phương, từ việc duy trì hòa bình, ổn định cho đến đảm bảo tự do đi lại trên biển và triển khai Tuyên bố về cách ứng xử của các bên ở Biển Đông (DOC) đã được Hiệp hội các quốc gia Đông Nam Á (ASEAN) và Trung Quốc ký tháng 10/2002.
 
Biển Đông (ảnh minh họa)
Biển Đông (ảnh: Tuấn Phạm)
 
Tuyên bố khẳng định việc Trung Quốc tuyên bố chủ quyền lãnh hải với "Đường 9 điểm" trên bản đồ (đường lưỡi bò) chiếm tới 80% diện tích Biển Đông là không phù hợp và đã bị cộng đồng quốc tế chỉ trích.

Tuyên bố cho rằng các bên liên quan cần duy trì cam kết giải quyết tranh chấp lãnh thổ và pháp lý ở Biển Đông thông qua thương lượng hòa bình, trên cơ sở tuân thủ các nguyên tắc, luật pháp quốc tế, bao gồm Công ước Liên hợp quốc về Luật biển năm 1982 và 5 nguyên tắc chung sống hòa bình, tăng cường các nỗ lực xây dựng lòng tin, hợp tác đa phương về an toàn biển, nghiên cứu khoa học, chống tội phạm và hướng tới ký kết Bộ Quy tắc về ứng xử ở biển Đông (COC).

Tuyên bố cho rằng việc hướng tới ký COC là nỗ lực chung của cả ASEAN và Trung Quốc, thể hiện bước tiến tích cực hướng tới hòa bình và ổn định trong khu vực. Không chỉ các nước trong khu vực mà cả các cường quốc bên ngoài khu vực như Mỹ, Australia, Nga, Ấn Độ, Nhật Bản, Hàn Quốc cũng có vai trò hữu ích trong việc duy trì tình trạng hiện nay, cần tiếp tục ủng hộ DOC.

ASEAN và Trung Quốc cần tiếp tục triển khai các bước tích cực trong vấn đề DOC, đẩy nhanh nỗ lực hướng tới COC và Ban Thư ký ASEAN có thể có quyền hạn lớn hơn trong thực thi quá trình hòa bình để giải quyết các xung đột, ASEAN cần trung thành với nguyên tắc thống nhất, đoàn kết và nhất trí trong việc phối hợp và phát triển vị thế chung của khối trong đối thoại với các đối tác liên quan đến các vấn đề Biển Đông và bắt đầu thảo luận về COC.

Cơ chế Hội nghị Bộ trưởng Quốc phòng ASEAN và các nước đối tác (ADMM +) cần được xem là diễn đàn quan trọng thúc đẩy cam kết mang tính xây dựng giữa ASEAN và các đối tác trong các vấn đề chiến lược, quốc phòng và an ninh tác động đến khu vực.

Tại hội thảo, các học giả, chuyên gia trong nhiều lĩnh vực đến từ Ấn Độ, Indonesia, Singapore, Philippines, Việt Nam, Australia,... đã trình bày 13 tham luận nghiên cứu về những vấn đề liên quan đến Biển Đông được dư luận các nước trong khu vực và quốc tế quan tâm. Các diễn giả cũng trao đổi ý kiến, giải thích rõ hơn và trả lời các câu hỏi của các đại biểu.

Bế mạc hội thảo, ông A.B Mahapatra, Giám đốc Trung tâm nghiên cứu chiến lược châu Á của Ấn Độ, khẳng định việc giải quyết các tranh chấp, xây dựng lòng tin trong bối cảnh có những sự phụ thuộc toàn cầu và xung đột phức tạp hiện nay là đòi hỏi cấp thiết; theo tinh thần đó, việc xây dựng năng lực và lòng tin ở Biển Đông, cũng như thể chế hóa đối thoại về những vấn đề có khả năng gây bất đồng là sự hỗ trợ bổ sung cần thiết cho khu vực châu Á-Thái Bình Dương.

Ông Mahapatra cũng nhấn mạnh hai vấn đề quan tâm hàng đầu tại Biển Đông là xu hướng hiện đại hóa lực lượng vũ trang thông thường có thể làm gia tăng căng thẳng tại khu vực này. Ông cho rằng cần xây dựng một cơ chế chung cho việc khai thác các nguồn tài nguyên ở Biển Đông và việc sử dụng vũ lực để giải quyết các vấn đề là rất nguy hiểm.

Hội thảo do Trung tâm Habibie của Indonesia và Trung tâm nghiên cứu chiến lược châu Á (CASS) của Ấn Độ phối hợp tổ chức với sự tham dự của hơn 150 đại biểu.


Theo TTXVN/Vietnam+

16/05 Adequate branding, marketing needed for developers


Monday,  May 16,2011,23:44 (GMT+7)

By Dinh Dung in HCMC
A motorbike rider passes an apartment project under development in HCMC’s District 2. In a gloomy market like it is now, better brand and marketing would help property developers to sell products - Photo: Dinh Dung
Brand building is not a new issue for many enterprises; however, it seems to be a forgotten factor for many property developers which have not invested adequately in the activity that has a positive effect to the sales of their housing products, especially in the current gloomy market.
The property market booming in the past years triggered a rush in housing project developments around the country as hundreds of companies joined the market for the sake of profits, and the easy market given a huge housing demand made many companies overlook marketing programs to build up their brands.
Brett Ashton, managing director of Savills Vietnam, shared experiences as a property services provider that many property developers have spent tens, even hundreds of millions of dollars to build up a huge residential project, but they have had very little investment in, or even ignored the brand building activity for their projects.
Speaking at a seminar themed Vietnam Real Estate Marketing 2001 organized at the hotel Legend Saigon in downtown HCMC last Thursday by Lean Media Group, Ashton said that branding played a very important role in supporting product sales once it was adequately attended to.
Some property experts have the same ideas, saying that property developers will find it hard to convince buyers and investors to buy housing products if they failed to highlight three elements including their projects’ legal status, implementation progress and prestige and brand. Reality shows that some developers with recognized brand have an advantage in the market, even in the tough time. 
Patti Joslin Ndzana Etoga, operations directors of CB Richard Ellis Vietnam (CBRE), seconded the above idea, saying that brand would help to quickly and easily identify a property or a service. It enhances values and sets expectation levels for quality and standards. However, looking to the top ten brands in Vietnam, one has not seen any property brand in the shortlist.
She said gone were the days when developers built up their condo projects and waited for buyers lining up to buy as seen in 2007. Real estate marketing activity has been limited among many developers, and when the market went down, they would suffer.
The market size, according to CBRE, has increased significantly in recent years as many high rise developers have entered this year with a large amount of stock, especially in the high-end segment. In 2008, the market had some 24 projects with some 6,700 apartments from luxury to affordable ones. However, as of early this year there were some 46,600 housing units launched into the market, causing a stiff competition among developers.
Meanwhile, buyers are maintaining a ‘wait and see’ attitude, hoping prices and interest rates to come down. In addition, poor liquidity in the market has decreased the number of speculators or secondary investors. Many developers have become creative to stoke sales including lucky draws with high-value prizes including cars and motorbikes.
The CBRE’s operations director suggested that to wake up sales, developers should invest more to research the market, select marketing tools and spend more money for marketing programs.
She said developers should bring budgets up to the level that the project deserves, preparing to spend up to 3% of their revenue to support their sales besides selecting smart public relations, press and social media.
She shared experiences that people buy on emotion, thus marketing program should touch the senses including “see, feel, touch, smell and sound.” That means it should be real.
In fact, some property developers are using real apartment to convince buyers, rather than showing model apartment to potential buyers. For example, the project owner of the Xi Riverview Palace in Thao Dien Ward in HCMC’s District 2 has opened real apartments at the project’s site for potential buyers touring for a real feeling, although the Korean developer has built a model housing gallery on a site near the project. Besides the project, some other developers, instead of building model apartments, have used an entire floor to design model apartments to convince potential buyers with real image of their future home.
Ashton of Savills said developers should identify the right target market segment and mainstream to tailor their housing products to potential buyers. Besides having a suitable product, the pricing strategy should be considered in the current market situation where middle income earners are the largest segment of buyers.
He said to boost sales, some developers were offering heavy incentives including implicit discount via promotion, interest rate support, discounting for group buyers and flexible payment schedule. Like other property experts, he said that brand building, increasing marketing program and selecting different tools to promote their products including internet channel were what property developers have to make use to tap the market demand rather than sitting and waiting a miracle happens as seen in the past.
The Saigon Times Daily