YANGON, Dec. 23 (Xinhua) -- Foreign investment in Myanmar hit 40.424 billion U.S. dollars in 456 projects as of the end of November 2011 since the country opened to such investment in late 1988, according to the latest figures of the Directorate of Investment and Company Administration issued on Friday.
Of the 31 countries and regions investing in Myanmar, China led with 13.947 billion U.S. dollars accounting for 34.5 percent, followed by Thailand with 9.568 billion U.S. dollars, China's Hong Kong with 6.308 billion U.S. dollars, South Korea with 2.938 billion U.S. dollars, Britain with 2.659 billion U.S. dollars and Singapore with 1.818 billion U.S. dollars.
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Showing posts with label Myanmar. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Myanmar. Show all posts
Friday, December 23, 2011
Foreign investment in Myanmar hits over 40 bln USD in 23 years
Friday, December 2, 2011
02/12 Kinh tế Myanmar sẽ vượt qua Việt Nam?
Tác giả: HUNG NINH (THEO WSJ)
"Nếu đi đúng hướng, rất có thể kinh tế Myanmar sẽ phát triển nhanh, thậm chí còn nhanh hơn so với Việt Nam", ông Philipp Hoffmann, TGĐ Công ty Dịch vụ Thương mại và Công nghiệp Jebsen & Jessen của Singapore nhận định.
Từng bị cô lập trong quá khứ
Myanmar - một thị trường đã từng bị cô lập trong một thời gian dài hiện đang thu hút được sự quan tâm rất lớn từ các doanh nghiệp nước ngoài nhờ những triển vọng tiềm năng. Đó là dấu hiệu cho thấy đã có những thay đổi tích cực về quan hệ giữa Myanmar và các nước phương Tây, làm gia tăng hy vọng về sự hủy bỏ lệnh trừng phạt của phương Tây dành cho nước này.
Ý nghĩa chuyến thăm Miến Điện của bà Clinton
Đoàn Xuân Lộc
Gửi cho BBC từ Global Policy Institute, London
Cập nhật: 08:54 GMT - thứ tư, 30 tháng 11, 2011
Hoa Kỳ vẫn còn đang duy trì lệnh cấm vận với Miến Điện
Bà Hillary Clinton đã tới thăm Miến Điện ngày 30/11. Đây là lần đầu tiên sau hơn 50 năm, một ngoại trưởng Mỹ tới nước này.
Câu hỏi mà giới quan sát đặt ra là tại sao lại có chuyến đi lịch sử như vậy vào lúc này?
Các bài liên quan
Cách đây một năm, với tình trạng nhân quyền tại Miến Điện và lập trường cứng rắn của Mỹ đối với lãnh đạo nước này, khó ai có thể đoán rằng một chuyến thăm cấp cao như vậy có thể xảy ra. Nhưng kể từ khi giới lãnh đạo nước này cho tổ chức bầu cử vào tháng 11 năm ngoái và thiết lập một chính phủ dân sự sau gần hai thập kỷ, Miến Điện đã có những thay đổi quan trọng.
Tuesday, November 15, 2011
15/11 Vietnamese PM meets with visiting Myanmar army commander-in-chief
HANOI, Nov. 14 (Xinhua) -- Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung on Monday met with visiting Commander-in-Chief of Myanmar armed forces Min Aung Hlaing. The Vietnamese prime minister highly evaluated the results of the talks and the signing of the memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation between the two countries, saying the visit would make a practical contribution to boosting Vietnam-Myanmar relations. Vietnam attaches importance to developing relations with Myanmar for the two countries' prosperity and for development of the ASEAN community, Dung said. |
Monday, June 13, 2011
13/06 Vietnamese Deputy PM Myanmar visit bring business cooperation to new high
| English.news.cn 2011-06-13 12:32:18 |
YANGON, June 13 (Xinhua) -- Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister Hoang Trung Hai, who is special envoy of Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, concluded his four-day Myanmar visit Sunday, bringing the two countries' business cooperation to a new high.
During the visit in Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar President U Thein Sein met with Hoang who had discussions with Vice President U Tin Aung Myint Oo. The two sides exchanged views on promoting bilateral cooperation for mutual interest.
Two memorandums of understanding (MoU) were respectively signed on financial cooperation and meat sector cooperation.
Hoang's visit also highlighted his meeting with Myanmar Union Minister of Agriculture and Irrigation U Myint Hlaing which focused on cooperation in agricultural and livestock breeding sectors and private sectors of the two countries and development of investment as well as collaborative efforts for raw materials and finished products under product sharing basis in the agriculture-based industrial sector.
A seminar on business cooperation between Myanmar and Vietnam, the second in its series, was launched at the Myanmar International Convention Center in Nay Pyi Taw, participated by both government and business sectors between the two countries.
Addressing the seminar, Myanmar Vice President U Tin Aung Myint Oo said the seminar enhanced bilateral friendship between the two countries and between its businessmen which will lead to good prospects for trade promotion in various sectors.
Noting that the administration and the economic structure of Myanmar is changing, U Tin Aung Myint Oo said the country is amending related rules and regulations for development of the economy pointing out that trade and investment remain the driving force which Myanmar is reviewing the related financial matters in order to be more beneficial for businesses.
He called for increased cooperation between the two sides to achieve better outcome for mutual benefit.
Hoang underlined that the cooperation move has paved way for the promotion of tourism, trade and investment between the two countries.
During his visit in Yangon, Hoang inaugurated the showroom of Viglacera of Vietnam and country representative office, introducing Vietnam-made interior decoration materials to Myanmar customers.
Hoang also attended Myanmar-Vietnam Business Exchange in Yangon, during which the Association of Vietnamese Investors in Myanmar ( AVIM) and the Union of Myanmar Federation of Chambers of Commerce and industry (UMFCCI_) signed a MoU on cooperation, followed by more MoUs being reached between private companies of Vietnam and Myanmar.
According to official statistics, Myanmar-Vietnam bilateral trade amounted to about 160 million U.S dollars in 2010, an increase of 60 percent from 2009.
Of the total, Myanmar's export to Vietnam took 108 million dollars, while its import from the Southeast Asian member represented 47 million dollars.
Vietnam, which stands the 20th among Myanmar's exporting countries, mainly imports from Myanmar its forestry products, agricultural produces, seafood and electrical goods, spare parts, while exporting to the country steel, electronic equipment, textiles, pharmaceuticals, medicines, construction materials, industrial products, chemical products, computer and accessories, plastic, cosmetics and engine oil.
Meanwhile, Vietnam's investment in Myanmar amounted to 23.649 million dollars as of March this year since Myanmar opened to foreign investment in late 1988.
In April 2010, Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung visited Nay Pyi Taw agreeing with Myanmar on promotion of cooperation in 12 key sectors -- agriculture, industrial crops, fishery, banking and finance, aviation, telecommunication, oil and gas, mining, electric equipment production, automobile manufacturing and assembling, construction, trade and investment cooperation.
Seven follow-up contracts and memorandums of understanding on bilateral cooperation related to investment promotion, fishery, agriculture, finance, communications and mining were also signed.
A conference on Vietnam investment promotion held during Dung's visit in Yangon further produced 11 other MoU on investment promotion between Myanmar and Vietnamese economic entrepreneurs covering the fields of communication, fishery, energy, trade, tourism and sports.
A representative office of Bank for Investment and Development of Vietnam (BIDV) was also inaugurated by Dung then.
In March 2010, Myanmar and Vietnam established direct air link with the Vietnam Airlines flying between Hanoi and Yangon, which was followed by another direct flight between Ho Chi Minh city and Yangon in November the same year.
The direct air link between the two countries contributes not only to development of commercial and trade activities, investment and tourism but also to promoting socio-economic and cultural relations in the region.
Editor: Liu |
Tuesday, October 5, 2010
23/09 AIPA thảo luận dự thảo Thông cáo chung
6:48 PM, 23/09/2010
(Chinhphu.vn) - Dự thảo Thông cáo chung đã được nhất trí thông qua để trình Đại hội đồng xem xét, chấp thuận tại Phiên họp toàn thể lần thứ hai sẽ diễn ra vào sáng 24/9/2010.
Theo Chương trình nghị sự của Đại hội đồng AIPA lần thứ 31, sáng nay 23/9/2010, Ủy ban Thông cáo chung đã họp để xem xét, thảo luận về dự thảo Thông cáo chung của Đại hội đồng AIPA-31.
Phiên họp diễn ra dưới sự chủ tọa của ông Ngô Quang Xuân, Phó Chủ nhiệm Ủy ban Đối ngoại của Quốc hội Việt Nam. Tham dự phiên họp có đầy đủ đại diện của 9 nước thành viên AIPA và 1 nước quan sát viên đặc biệt là Myanmar.
Dự thảo Thông cáo chung đề cập toàn bộ diễn biến nội dung hoạt động của Đại hội đồng AIPA lần thứ 31, từ phiên khai mạc, phiên họp toàn thể lần thứ nhất, các cuộc họp của các Ủy ban đến các cuộc đối thoại với các bên quan sát viên, đồng thời ghi nhận địa điểm và thời gian sẽ tổ chức Đại hội đồng AIPA 32; công tác tổ chức Đại hội đồng AIPA 31 của nước chủ nhà Việt Nam.
Với tinh thần trách nhiệm cao, các thành viên tham dự phiên họp đã thảo luận chi tiết về các mục của dự thảo Thông cáo. Các ý kiến đã được nghiên cứu tiếp thu ngay tại phiên họp.
Hải Minh
(Chinhphu.vn) - Dự thảo Thông cáo chung đã được nhất trí thông qua để trình Đại hội đồng xem xét, chấp thuận tại Phiên họp toàn thể lần thứ hai sẽ diễn ra vào sáng 24/9/2010.
Đoàn Việt Nam tại phiên họp Uỷ ban Thông cáo chung.
Theo Chương trình nghị sự của Đại hội đồng AIPA lần thứ 31, sáng nay 23/9/2010, Ủy ban Thông cáo chung đã họp để xem xét, thảo luận về dự thảo Thông cáo chung của Đại hội đồng AIPA-31.
Phiên họp diễn ra dưới sự chủ tọa của ông Ngô Quang Xuân, Phó Chủ nhiệm Ủy ban Đối ngoại của Quốc hội Việt Nam. Tham dự phiên họp có đầy đủ đại diện của 9 nước thành viên AIPA và 1 nước quan sát viên đặc biệt là Myanmar.
Dự thảo Thông cáo chung đề cập toàn bộ diễn biến nội dung hoạt động của Đại hội đồng AIPA lần thứ 31, từ phiên khai mạc, phiên họp toàn thể lần thứ nhất, các cuộc họp của các Ủy ban đến các cuộc đối thoại với các bên quan sát viên, đồng thời ghi nhận địa điểm và thời gian sẽ tổ chức Đại hội đồng AIPA 32; công tác tổ chức Đại hội đồng AIPA 31 của nước chủ nhà Việt Nam.
Với tinh thần trách nhiệm cao, các thành viên tham dự phiên họp đã thảo luận chi tiết về các mục của dự thảo Thông cáo. Các ý kiến đã được nghiên cứu tiếp thu ngay tại phiên họp.
Hải Minh
Sunday, September 19, 2010
26/07 ASEAN Regional Forum touches difficult issues
July-26-2010
On July 23, 2010, the 17th Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum was held in Hanoi, Vietnam. The only official multilateral security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific region, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) has been condemned as a "talk-shop," but this year it discussed many sensitive and tough international and regional issues.
ARF has grown in significance and scale since its inception. Established in 1994, ARF has 27 members – 10 from ASEAN member countries, 10 ASEAN partners and seven observers. The members bring a variety of perspectives because they have different political systems, levels of economic development, cultural identities and strategic objectives.
The Korean Peninsula security problem remained an important issue in the agenda of ARF. Since its establishment, all the previous statements initiated by ARF have shown concern about the intricate situation on the Korean peninsula. Since accession to ARF, the North Korea sent its foreign minister to participate in ARF for the first time. Thus, ARF becomes another important channel to talk about the security situation on the Korean peninsula.
Since the March 26 sinking of Cheonan, a South Korean warship, the North and South have each stuck to its own argument and are in a fierce struggle. The recent US-South Korean joint military exercise in the Sea of Japan has exacerbated the security situation in Northeast Asia.
Adding to the tension in the area, in June, a Myanmar exile group disclosed that Myanmar sought to develop a secret nuclear program. Considering the sensitivity and danger of nuclear proliferation, the international community expressed grave concern about Myanmar's nuclear program. Myanmar officials have repeatedly said Myanmar is a member of the "Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty" and its additional protocol. Additionally, in accordance with the seven-step roadmap to democratic election, Myanmar is to hold a general election this autumn. The ARF called Myanmar to implement a "free, fair and inclusive" election.
Overall, the ARF is concerned about the regional security of East Asia. In recent years, the parties have recognized that consultation and cooperation can enhance mutual security trust and is the only way to solve the security issues. War and conflict only complicate matters. When dealing with non-traditional security issues, such as piracy, terrorism, environmental protection, drug trafficking and smuggling, the ARF has made a great contribution.
The ARF is still building confidence among its participants. There are many differences in the definition and practice of preventive diplomacy between East Asian countries and Western countries. Two fundamental principles of the ARF are non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries and a consensus to resolve regional security issues the "ASEAN way." Therefore, even though ARF discusses many sensitive issues, it only provides policy proposals to improve security and calm the situation.
The ARF has no intentions of interfering with the situation on the Korean peninsula. The ARF only expressed concern about the sinking of Cheonan, supported the Statement of the United Nations Security Council about it and called for the involved parties to keep restraint and resolve the disputes peacefully.
When the details of how Cheonan sank were still unclear, the United Nations Security Council issued a statement on July 9 that condemned the attack but did not name a responsible party. Singapore's foreign minister George Yeo said ASEAN was not likely to condemn North Korea for the incident.
The ARF also can't or won't condemn Myanmar. Some ASEAN countries clearly oppose interference in Myanmar's internal general election, saying it might trample ASEAN's principle of non-interference in internal affairs of other countries.
The ASEAN defense ministers will hold a forum with defense ministers from China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, New Zealand, Russia and the U.S. This could facilitate regional security cooperation, enhance mutual trust among regional and global powers and enhance regional stability and world peace.
If ASEAN can successfully lead the discussion among regional and global powers in the ARF, ASEAN will become the world's major regional actor. However, there are many concerns. As a complex set of ten small and medium countries, ASEAN still lacks experience in integrating and balancing external powers. If ASEAN cannot display the superiorities and advantages and dominate agendas and processes of related forums it presides, it will become the biggest victim of the power struggles.
On July 23, 2010, the 17th Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum was held in Hanoi, Vietnam. The only official multilateral security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific region, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) has been condemned as a "talk-shop," but this year it discussed many sensitive and tough international and regional issues.
ARF has grown in significance and scale since its inception. Established in 1994, ARF has 27 members – 10 from ASEAN member countries, 10 ASEAN partners and seven observers. The members bring a variety of perspectives because they have different political systems, levels of economic development, cultural identities and strategic objectives.
The Korean Peninsula security problem remained an important issue in the agenda of ARF. Since its establishment, all the previous statements initiated by ARF have shown concern about the intricate situation on the Korean peninsula. Since accession to ARF, the North Korea sent its foreign minister to participate in ARF for the first time. Thus, ARF becomes another important channel to talk about the security situation on the Korean peninsula.
Since the March 26 sinking of Cheonan, a South Korean warship, the North and South have each stuck to its own argument and are in a fierce struggle. The recent US-South Korean joint military exercise in the Sea of Japan has exacerbated the security situation in Northeast Asia.
Adding to the tension in the area, in June, a Myanmar exile group disclosed that Myanmar sought to develop a secret nuclear program. Considering the sensitivity and danger of nuclear proliferation, the international community expressed grave concern about Myanmar's nuclear program. Myanmar officials have repeatedly said Myanmar is a member of the "Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty" and its additional protocol. Additionally, in accordance with the seven-step roadmap to democratic election, Myanmar is to hold a general election this autumn. The ARF called Myanmar to implement a "free, fair and inclusive" election.
Overall, the ARF is concerned about the regional security of East Asia. In recent years, the parties have recognized that consultation and cooperation can enhance mutual security trust and is the only way to solve the security issues. War and conflict only complicate matters. When dealing with non-traditional security issues, such as piracy, terrorism, environmental protection, drug trafficking and smuggling, the ARF has made a great contribution.
The ARF is still building confidence among its participants. There are many differences in the definition and practice of preventive diplomacy between East Asian countries and Western countries. Two fundamental principles of the ARF are non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries and a consensus to resolve regional security issues the "ASEAN way." Therefore, even though ARF discusses many sensitive issues, it only provides policy proposals to improve security and calm the situation.
The ARF has no intentions of interfering with the situation on the Korean peninsula. The ARF only expressed concern about the sinking of Cheonan, supported the Statement of the United Nations Security Council about it and called for the involved parties to keep restraint and resolve the disputes peacefully.
When the details of how Cheonan sank were still unclear, the United Nations Security Council issued a statement on July 9 that condemned the attack but did not name a responsible party. Singapore's foreign minister George Yeo said ASEAN was not likely to condemn North Korea for the incident.
The ARF also can't or won't condemn Myanmar. Some ASEAN countries clearly oppose interference in Myanmar's internal general election, saying it might trample ASEAN's principle of non-interference in internal affairs of other countries.
The ASEAN defense ministers will hold a forum with defense ministers from China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, New Zealand, Russia and the U.S. This could facilitate regional security cooperation, enhance mutual trust among regional and global powers and enhance regional stability and world peace.
If ASEAN can successfully lead the discussion among regional and global powers in the ARF, ASEAN will become the world's major regional actor. However, there are many concerns. As a complex set of ten small and medium countries, ASEAN still lacks experience in integrating and balancing external powers. If ASEAN cannot display the superiorities and advantages and dominate agendas and processes of related forums it presides, it will become the biggest victim of the power struggles.
What's going on in Myanmar?
By Federico Abbasciano
1 CommentsPrint E-mail China.org.cn, September 3, 2010
The biggest country in continental South East Asia, one of the few remaining military dictatorships in the world, will hold elections for the first time in twenty years this coming November. By the look of it, it seems like the junta that rules the country will use the occasion to essentially go on as before, only with a civilian hat. But why is Myanmar—or Burma as some prefer to call it—in this situation? Can we learn something about the country today by looking at its recent past?
Burma enjoys a strategic position between India and China, and once had the region's most prosperous agriculture. As the Asia-Pacific War came to its shores, this proved a curse more than a blessing: much of the country's infrastructure was reduced to rubble during the long and costly Burma campaign. The essentially 'foreign' nature of the war ensured that all subsequent governments would shun any involvement in international organizations, from the British Commonwealth to ASEAN (until 1997). Right after the 1950 independence, Prime Minister U Nu steered the country away from the deadly dangers of the cold war and of the budding Sino-Indian rivalry. He saw Burma as a 'tender gourd among the cactus' and declared that only neutralism could save it. As his government succumbed to intra-ethnic disagreements, with some of the minority groups populating the borderlands threatening to secede from the Union, the head of the armed forces, General Ne Win, took hold of power and effectively began an outright retreat from the outside world that has more or less lasted to the present day.
The other major tendency that, along with isolationism, has been present in all Burmese governments since at least the early 1960s is nationalism. This grew out of the shock for British India's occupation of the country. Unlike with most other colonies and dependencies, the British decided to get rid of Burma's whole ruling class and civil servants, even at the lowest levels. This was done in reaction to the Burmese Crown's stubborn resistance to political and commercial submission. Indeed, as Thant Myint-U reminds us in his The Making of Modern Burma, conquering the whole country had not been in the plans of the Raj at all. Writing to the governor general of India in 1867, secretary of State Lord Cranbourne said "Our influence in that country ought to be paramount. The country itself is of no great importance. But an easy communication with the multitudes who inhabit Western China is an object of national importance." When faced with the elites' total refusal to compromise, though, the British finally seized the whole country and in 1885 made it an Indian province. Distrustful of the ethnic Burmans, the British entrusted the administration and the military to Indians or members of the numerous ethnic minorities. As a reaction to this, the ethnic Burmans developed in the early twentieth century one of the strongest anticolonial movements within the British empire. U Nu's project of a Union inclusive of all nationalities was doomed to fail; governments since 1962, including the military junta now in power, have had very little patience for the non-Burmans, whom they consider traitors for their earlier support of the British and for having cultural, religious and linguistic ties with groups living outside the confines of this artificial nation-state. Only the army can keep the country together, or so the official story goes, obviously. For the army top brass, governing the country after the British said the Burmans were 'lacking of soldierly discipline' is a source of considerable pride. I have little doubt that at least some of them, when they are not too busy hoarding the precious stones the country is famous for or selling its virgin forests to Chinese or Thai logging companies, really think they are defending Burma from interfering foreigners and their henchmen.
This basic outline of Burma's recent history might be helpful if we are interested in understanding its contemporary political developments. UN, US and UK, predictably, have questioned the validity of this coming round of polls, arguing that the continuing oppressive rule of the military means there will be "no level playing field" for opposition candidates. Denouncing elections in Myanmar as "not free and fair", while undeniably true, sounds today almost like criticizing wrestling matches for being rigged. After all, Myanmar hasn't been a democracy for nearly 50 years; it's a country where political activists are routinely harassed by the army or its hired thugs, and where the most prominent opposition politician, Aung San Suu Kyi, has spent 16 years out of the past 21 in confinement. Even if the ruling junta did not put restrictions on parties and candidates eligible for elections—which they did—we would be hard-pressed to find reasons for calling these elections "free". What to do then? Should we boycott the new civilian government, which will very likely be full of former members of the armed forces? Well, we could do that, and that's what Aung San Suu Kyi has been calling on the foreign community to do. Indeed, she's been asking to isolate Burma for most of her active political life, arguing that sanctions will help topple the regime. While I do respect her position and courageous resistance to the junta, I think this strategy is ultimately self-defeating. Heresy? Let's see.
A Burmese army officer once said "I would like to tell my American friends that sanctions will hurt you more than us. After all, we virtually imposed sanctions on ourselves for 30 years, and we are still here." These words were recorded on paper for the first time (in a Christian Science Monitor article by Yves Cohen) on 28 January 1998. Now, over twelve years later, Myanmar is still stuck with sanctions. And, sure enough, the junta is still here. The point is that a regime that feeds on a nationalism that has often bordered on xenophobia and eyes suspiciously not only foreigners, but even local people with foreign contacts or education, will never be swayed by speeches made by foreign diplomats calling for a release of political prisoners (especially if, like Suu Kyi, they went to Oxford and were married to a Brit). Or by sanctions that fail—as usual—to hurt its elites. Add to this the fact that most neighbors of the country in question don't wish to isolate it at all, and you have the net result of twenty years of UN, EU and US Burma policies: zilch. While there are political reasons why many Western governments have held this sort of attitude towards Myanmar (appearing to close eyes to the junta's egregious human rights violations would be a tough sell for the public in most democracies), I have the feeling that some of this resistance to apply options that are not the cookie-cutter sanctions-and-speeches mixture stems from a fundamental ignorance of the country's history. The EU's Special Envoy to Myanmar (you will be forgiven for not realizing there is one), Piero Fassino, declared over two years ago in a press conference "I am not interested in history, I'm a politician". If you are reading this website you will probably agree with me when I say that with this sort of thinking our chances of having an impact on Myanmar are close to zero. It's hard, but let's try again with engagement, because isolation is exactly what the ruling junta is comfortable with.
The elections in Myanmar will not be perfect. The new government will not be a democracy. But after twenty years of political stagnation, the country might finally have some civilian institutions and a national assembly including some opposition parties and representatives of minority groups. This might not seem much but it is better than more of the same.
This post was first published at http://www.understoodbackwards.net/2010/09/02/whats-going-on-in-myanmar/
1 CommentsPrint E-mail China.org.cn, September 3, 2010
The biggest country in continental South East Asia, one of the few remaining military dictatorships in the world, will hold elections for the first time in twenty years this coming November. By the look of it, it seems like the junta that rules the country will use the occasion to essentially go on as before, only with a civilian hat. But why is Myanmar—or Burma as some prefer to call it—in this situation? Can we learn something about the country today by looking at its recent past?
Burma enjoys a strategic position between India and China, and once had the region's most prosperous agriculture. As the Asia-Pacific War came to its shores, this proved a curse more than a blessing: much of the country's infrastructure was reduced to rubble during the long and costly Burma campaign. The essentially 'foreign' nature of the war ensured that all subsequent governments would shun any involvement in international organizations, from the British Commonwealth to ASEAN (until 1997). Right after the 1950 independence, Prime Minister U Nu steered the country away from the deadly dangers of the cold war and of the budding Sino-Indian rivalry. He saw Burma as a 'tender gourd among the cactus' and declared that only neutralism could save it. As his government succumbed to intra-ethnic disagreements, with some of the minority groups populating the borderlands threatening to secede from the Union, the head of the armed forces, General Ne Win, took hold of power and effectively began an outright retreat from the outside world that has more or less lasted to the present day.
The other major tendency that, along with isolationism, has been present in all Burmese governments since at least the early 1960s is nationalism. This grew out of the shock for British India's occupation of the country. Unlike with most other colonies and dependencies, the British decided to get rid of Burma's whole ruling class and civil servants, even at the lowest levels. This was done in reaction to the Burmese Crown's stubborn resistance to political and commercial submission. Indeed, as Thant Myint-U reminds us in his The Making of Modern Burma, conquering the whole country had not been in the plans of the Raj at all. Writing to the governor general of India in 1867, secretary of State Lord Cranbourne said "Our influence in that country ought to be paramount. The country itself is of no great importance. But an easy communication with the multitudes who inhabit Western China is an object of national importance." When faced with the elites' total refusal to compromise, though, the British finally seized the whole country and in 1885 made it an Indian province. Distrustful of the ethnic Burmans, the British entrusted the administration and the military to Indians or members of the numerous ethnic minorities. As a reaction to this, the ethnic Burmans developed in the early twentieth century one of the strongest anticolonial movements within the British empire. U Nu's project of a Union inclusive of all nationalities was doomed to fail; governments since 1962, including the military junta now in power, have had very little patience for the non-Burmans, whom they consider traitors for their earlier support of the British and for having cultural, religious and linguistic ties with groups living outside the confines of this artificial nation-state. Only the army can keep the country together, or so the official story goes, obviously. For the army top brass, governing the country after the British said the Burmans were 'lacking of soldierly discipline' is a source of considerable pride. I have little doubt that at least some of them, when they are not too busy hoarding the precious stones the country is famous for or selling its virgin forests to Chinese or Thai logging companies, really think they are defending Burma from interfering foreigners and their henchmen.
This basic outline of Burma's recent history might be helpful if we are interested in understanding its contemporary political developments. UN, US and UK, predictably, have questioned the validity of this coming round of polls, arguing that the continuing oppressive rule of the military means there will be "no level playing field" for opposition candidates. Denouncing elections in Myanmar as "not free and fair", while undeniably true, sounds today almost like criticizing wrestling matches for being rigged. After all, Myanmar hasn't been a democracy for nearly 50 years; it's a country where political activists are routinely harassed by the army or its hired thugs, and where the most prominent opposition politician, Aung San Suu Kyi, has spent 16 years out of the past 21 in confinement. Even if the ruling junta did not put restrictions on parties and candidates eligible for elections—which they did—we would be hard-pressed to find reasons for calling these elections "free". What to do then? Should we boycott the new civilian government, which will very likely be full of former members of the armed forces? Well, we could do that, and that's what Aung San Suu Kyi has been calling on the foreign community to do. Indeed, she's been asking to isolate Burma for most of her active political life, arguing that sanctions will help topple the regime. While I do respect her position and courageous resistance to the junta, I think this strategy is ultimately self-defeating. Heresy? Let's see.
A Burmese army officer once said "I would like to tell my American friends that sanctions will hurt you more than us. After all, we virtually imposed sanctions on ourselves for 30 years, and we are still here." These words were recorded on paper for the first time (in a Christian Science Monitor article by Yves Cohen) on 28 January 1998. Now, over twelve years later, Myanmar is still stuck with sanctions. And, sure enough, the junta is still here. The point is that a regime that feeds on a nationalism that has often bordered on xenophobia and eyes suspiciously not only foreigners, but even local people with foreign contacts or education, will never be swayed by speeches made by foreign diplomats calling for a release of political prisoners (especially if, like Suu Kyi, they went to Oxford and were married to a Brit). Or by sanctions that fail—as usual—to hurt its elites. Add to this the fact that most neighbors of the country in question don't wish to isolate it at all, and you have the net result of twenty years of UN, EU and US Burma policies: zilch. While there are political reasons why many Western governments have held this sort of attitude towards Myanmar (appearing to close eyes to the junta's egregious human rights violations would be a tough sell for the public in most democracies), I have the feeling that some of this resistance to apply options that are not the cookie-cutter sanctions-and-speeches mixture stems from a fundamental ignorance of the country's history. The EU's Special Envoy to Myanmar (you will be forgiven for not realizing there is one), Piero Fassino, declared over two years ago in a press conference "I am not interested in history, I'm a politician". If you are reading this website you will probably agree with me when I say that with this sort of thinking our chances of having an impact on Myanmar are close to zero. It's hard, but let's try again with engagement, because isolation is exactly what the ruling junta is comfortable with.
The elections in Myanmar will not be perfect. The new government will not be a democracy. But after twenty years of political stagnation, the country might finally have some civilian institutions and a national assembly including some opposition parties and representatives of minority groups. This might not seem much but it is better than more of the same.
This post was first published at http://www.understoodbackwards.net/2010/09/02/whats-going-on-in-myanmar/
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